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Ladies and Gentlemen, 
Thank you very much for having me here for this guest lecture. It is an honour to 
return to the College of Europe – where I studied myself – to share some of the things 
I have learned about international trade in recent years. 
When you look at the world, it is clear something has changed. The old presumptions 
we based our worldview on have been abandoned. Executive tweets move markets 
and old ties are cut, while new, often digital and intangible ties, have come to 
define our world. This is not easy to make sense of – to put it bluntly, there is a lot 
going on. 
It was the trend of the 20th century to look for stability through the separation of 
politics, security and trade. Indeed, that was what the EU was built on. It seems that 
the trend of the early 21st century is the opposite.  
Across the West, we have seen economic crisis and demographic change. Along 
with these trends – perhaps even because of them – we see the meeting point of 
trade, security and the economy increasingly politicised. In our discourse, facts and 
evidence driven policy are increasingly abandoned. Experts have been put by the 
wayside and the rhetoric around policy is weaponised to win elections and achieve 
other goals. 
This is not only notable in trade policy, but other policies too. This is a dangerous 
experiment – and takes us in the direction that Hannah Arendt warned us of, where 
people might ‘at the same time believe everything and nothing, think that 
everything was possible and nothing was true’. 
I will use the term populism in this lecture, but I do not want to be misunderstood. 
There is a tendency among those discussing society these days to use the term 
populism as a pejorative, to encompass anyone who wants to make changes to the 
way we live. I want to use it specifically – to describe a particular political strategy 
and outlook. 
Populism, like democracy, accepts popular sovereignty and majoritarianism. 
However, it fuels itself using anti-democratic means. It calls for a homogenous 
society, promotes tribalism and rejects the liberal concept of protection of the 
individual – and of leaving the chance of the minority to become the majority. It is 
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anti-pluralist, believing that society cannot function with different systems, groups 
and sources of authority. In short, it is in opposition to many of the basic tenets of the 
EU. 
But how did we get here? To this point, where populism has enough oxygen to catch 
alight. When I reflect on this, I can trace it back to three concepts – trust, fear and 
power. 
In terms of trust, recently we have seen it eroding – in our institutions, in our 
governance and in our leaders. Much of this springs from the economic crisis. The 
presumptions that underpinned much of our globalised society were challenged – 
presumptions about increased stability and risk and responsibility. When people saw 
that those responsible for the crisis carried on at their expense, they questioned who 
these institutions were accountable to – a topic so expertly treated by the late Irish 
political scientist Peter Mair in his powerful work “Ruling the Void”. 
The second thing accountable for the rise of populism is fear. Another political 
scientist, this time Bulgarian, Ivan Krastev described it well in his book “After Europe”. 
He described a world where people saw their societies transforming, their young 
moving away, and untrustworthy leaders as inclined to abandon them. This is 
combined with inflammatory language targeting foreigners and other scapegoats, 
as well as a blatant disregard for facts and evidence. Altogether, we find ourselves in 
a fearful environment ripe for exploitation. 
Finally, the last thing fuelling this kind of populism is a fundamental shift in the 
balance of power on the world stage. Many of the presumptions that underpinned 
international relations during the 20th century are changing – we are entering a 
multipolar world, governed by a battle for technological supremacy and cyber 
threats. We see the global economic centre of gravity shift east and alternative 
models challenging liberal democracy. 
How can we respond to these issues? We need a multi-layered and creative 
approach – accounting for societal transformations, public opinion and a changing 
world. But before anything else, we need demonstrable and responsible leadership – 
and we need institutions and societal norms that hold leaders to account and that 
do not try to give simple answers to complex questions. This is also and perhaps 
particularly true in trade policy. 
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Today I am going to try to paint a picture in three parts. First, I will discuss the 
challenges we face – trade tensions, technology war, the great decoupling of the US 
and China. Second, I will illustrate Europe’s response – becoming more assertive on 
the world stage, standing up for multilateralism and green issues, cutting a path 
between American belligerence and China’s authoritarian state-led model. Finally, I 
will talk about what this future might look like – the benefits trade could and does 
bring, the potential for a rules-based world where Europe sets regulatory standards 
and is listened to through the power of its single market. 
 
Analysis of the problem: The great decoupling 
The 20th century painted a shocking picture of industrial-age destruction – war, 
environmental degradation, growing inequality. We responded to this, but not 
always on time or in the right way. We built institutions and coalitions to stand up for 
freedom. However, now those institutions are aging, the world is changing – and the 
21st century, the cyber-age is no more immune to crack-ups and catastrophes. 
Nowhere is this clearer than in the battle for supremacy between China and the US. 
This battle is potentially the biggest development for globalisation since the collapse 
of the Soviet Union.  
But why is it happening? Fundamentally, it is a great power competition – a battle in 
technology, in global economics and in values. Indeed, often when we talk about 
trade policy these days, we are not actually talking about trade policy. If we were 
actually talking about trade, the fact that these tensions are already disrupting 
beneficial flows of technology, talent and investment worldwide would be factored 
in. But no, it has become a proxy through which this battle for international political 
leadership is taking place. 
At the moment this battle is more or less centred around the 4.5 trillion EUR global 
tech sector – we see struggles over 5G, semiconductors and other critical 
technologies – but its also moving into a broader array of economic activity – cars, 
steel and more. Supply chains have been weaponised, imports are being blocked 
based on foreign policy disputes, and we are even seeing economic pressure 
applied to companies and individuals – as in the National Basketball Association in 
the US, when a tweet in support of Hong Kong resulted in a scandal that prompted 
questions about free speech and Chinese cultural influence. 
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This unravelling has led to tensions, and more explicit clashes over security, influence 
and values – and with a patriotic fervour on both sides that is not as ideologically 
stark as the Cold War, but I suspect will prove just as persistent. 
 
Visualisation of the problem: Spill overs on the global economy  
All this has further spill over effects on trade. It has in effect caused a crisis in the rules-
based international trading system. The World Trade Organisation, which has 
underpinned international trade for generations, is on the verge of collapse. There 
has been a movement towards power-based relations, and a tendency to revert to 
unilateralism and protectionism.  
As self-defeating and destructive as protectionism is, it is clearly on the rise. Since the 
financial crisis, every year we have witnessed double-digit increases in barriers 
around the world, costing EU entrepreneurs billions of euros every year. Only since 
2015, 207 new barriers have been reported by our Member States and businesses – 
this is almost half of the overall stock of 440 market access barriers recorded by the 
EU for its companies abroad. 
The International Monetary Fund has a tool for tracking trade uncertainty. Their latest 
Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index shows highly elevated levels. Having been 
stable at low levels for about 20 years, the index jumped 10-fold from previously 
recorded highs as the US-China trade war escalated in the first quarter of 2019. 
Global growth is projected to slow to approximately 3% in 2019 and 2020 from 3.8% in 
2018. With the weakest annual growth since the crisis, downside risks are mounting. 
Growth has been revised down in almost all G20 economies. 
Ironically, during this time of flux, the US took a step back from its leadership role in 
global politics. This allowed China to seek a greater role – presenting authoritarian 
state capitalism as both competition and an alternative model. This is concerning – 
they seek to revise the international order. As far as the EU is concerned, our primary 
goal is fairness, and there can be no fairness in global trade when two-fifths of the 
global economy writes their own rulebook independently.  
The US seems to get conscious that leaving a void is not necessarily conducive – 
evidenced by the fact that they have just appointed a special envoy with the 
mandate to stall China’s growing influence at the United Nations. However, better 
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than confronting China directly, it would be desirable that the US goes back to 
showing leadership and directly influencing the development of global institutions to 
promote the integration of China on fair terms. This is the only sustainable fix for the 
global economy. 
 
Solution of the problem: More assertive EU  
It is against this background that the EU needs to take on a stronger role in the world. 
This Commission has declared itself a ‘geopolitical Commission’”. We want to have 
our own voice and weigh in on global efforts. We want to uphold multilateralism and 
stand up for climate goals. We want to defend ourselves against unfair practices 
and alternative economic and political models. We want to leverage our Single 
Market to make our voice heard. 
In regulation, this means both holding multinationals to account for the taxes they 
owe and unifying the market for military trade within the EU. And in trade, it means 
guaranteeing a level playing field and stability on the world stage for EU companies, 
so the EU can continue to benefit from international trade. 
We also need to be clear about what we want to achieve – we are not interested in 
wielding power for power’s sake. The EU wants to make sure that its values are 
represented on the world stage – openness, democracy, a belief in multilateralism 
and fairness. We have already seen how this market-leverage for values promotion 
can be successful in the General Data Protection Regulation – a standard gradually 
being adopted worldwide. 
It is with this in mind that the priorities for the new Commissioner for Trade were set. 
 
Visualisation of the solution: New trade priorities 
Priority number one is preserving a stable, predictable and rules-based international 
trading environment. The first step will be leading the reform of the World Trade 
Organisation. It has become clear that there is a need for reform and modernisation 
– and not only on the dispute settlement side, but also on the rules side. We need 
better answers to the systemic questions of industrial subsidies, forced technology 
transfer and state-owned enterprises. But we also need answers to more existential 
ones – like climate change, sustainable development and more. 
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The current crisis has deep roots and there is no single source. That said, a lot is linked 
to the concern that the system is not adapted to deal with forms of state-capitalism. 
When China joined the WTO, there was a presumption that reforms would happen – 
reforms that never came. Now we are suffering the fallout – significant distortions in 
trade that affect the rights and balances of the WTO agreement. 
While we welcome the US and China finding ways to de-escalate their trade tensions 
– as they are benefiting no one – our goal is to convince both to strive for a more 
structural, rules-based solution within the WTO.  
We look for a kind of triangular solution. We need to convince the US to realise that 
they will not be able to take on China on their own. It is only jointly that we may have 
a chance of pushing for some structural changes, within a rules-based multilateral 
order. On the other hand, China needs to understand that it is only through the 
system they can guarantee safety from unilateralism. This may require a new Chinese 
down payment into the system; i.e. updated/stricter rules in the WTO. 
Critically, the Appellate Body, the highest dispute settlement body of the WTO, 
stopped working towards the end of last year. Appointments to the arbitration 
mechanism continue to be blocked by a frustrated US. We have come up with 
interim arrangements with willing partners, but this should not be confused with the 
goal of reforming the system. 
Our second priority is managing key relationships bilaterally. This is a multi-layered 
objective. The US is high on our list here – we need to restart and rejuvenate our 
relationship. The transatlantic connection remains a central artery of the world 
economy. We have a deep trade and investment relationship and shared values.  
The US exports almost half a trillion EUR to the EU, while EU investment in the US is well 
over 2 trillion EUR. 2.7 million US jobs are created by EU trade and over 4 million US 
jobs from EU investment. We are as critical to them as they are to us, but current 
difficulties distract us from the importance of common goals and cooperation. We 
need to maintain a positive agenda with the Americans, and manage our 
divergences through negotiation – for example, the Airbus/Boeing dispute, France’s 
digital tax, and the steel and car tariffs. 
China is another important relationship to manage. We released a communication 
on this in March 2019. It highlighted the need for a more differentiated and nuanced 
Sabine Weyand 
10 
relationship. Here too, we would prefer bilaterally agreed solutions, like through the 
EU-China investment agreement. We have made some, but certainly not sufficient 
progress there. There, as well as in other areas like rules on subsidies and forced 
technology transfer – China will need to show more ambition. 
Besides these, we seek to continue to diversify our trading relationships. We have 
spent the past several years successfully negotiating many agreements – we now 
have more than 40 agreements with over 70 countries worldwide. These agreements 
are about more than trade. They are building blocks for future rules and standards 
we hope to lock into the multilateral system. They are platforms for cooperation on 
global challenges, championing international standards, like those of the 
International Labour Organisation and the Paris Agreement. They are also strategic 
partnerships – alliances for open global trade in a time of protectionism. 
We want to finalise the negotiations we already have underway – Australia, New 
Zealand, Chile, Mexico and Indonesia – and find new agreements where they would 
be beneficial. We are looking to reinforce our relationship with Africa – and we are 
developing a new strategy in the coming year. We also want to build on 
engagement with our neighbours – including the modernisation of the EU-Swiss 
relationship and of course get things right with the UK. 
All of these relationships, new and old, will be receiving special attention from a new 
post in DG Trade – the Chief Trade Enforcement Officer, or CTEO. Now that we have 
so many agreements, we need to make sure they work right. The CTEO will work on 
enforcement and implementation: making sure that markets open up as agreed, 
that rules are followed, and that high consumer, environmental and labour 
standards are met.  
This will be critical to our third priority – contributing to other policy fields and 
overarching topics that matter for Europe. Trade does not exist in a vacuum. It needs 
to contribute to other policy areas too. A geopolitical Commission will require a 
much more integrated approach when it comes to certain policies. This will make 
them more effective, and also increase our leverage. 
A centrepiece of this new Commission is the EU Green Deal. Trade can contribute to 
this in a number of ways. To start, I will borrow from the medical community’s rule 
number one: Primum non nocere, or ‘first, do no harm’. That is the bare minimum. But 
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this does not mean shutting down trade and development for the sake of climate 
goals. We must have a more nuanced position than ‘trade means more emissions’. 
It is better for the climate to buy strawberries or tomatoes from Spain than to heat 
greenhouses in the UK. Poultry from Brazil and lamb from New Zealand have their 
transport emissions offset by other factors. And trade can have other, indirect spill 
overs on the environment too: encouraging innovation, triggering investment in low-
carbon production to meet EU standards, and lowering costs of environmental 
goods and services. 
We have a responsibility to keep our approaches evidence-based. Striking that 
balance will be important. Then, trade policy will need to contribute and to ensure 
that we can deliver effectively on our climate policy. We need instruments that 
ensure the effectiveness of climate goals. It is through this prism that we are looking 
at a Carbon Border Adjustment measure that is on our agenda for the coming year. 
It is not just green issues either – trade will need to pull its weight across the board. In 
industrial policy, we will need to fight to protect our interests – but not give into 
protectionism. We need to find a balance that will help Europe develop its strategic 
autonomy and maintain its security – home-grown technology, secure supply chains, 
intellectual property – while staying true to the values of a free market and 
competition. We are already working in this area with the FDI screening mechanism 
and the reform of dual use regulations. 
Trade needs to contribute to the Sustainable Development Goals too. We have 
already put labour rights, human rights, environmental and consumer standards in 
our agreements – we now need to make sure they are implemented properly. We 
can build on these efforts for a complete and coherent trade policy – one fit for the 
21st century. 
At the same time, we must acknowledge one critical thing – trade policy is not 
foreign policy. Neither is it security policy. Nor industrial, development or climate 
policy. Trade is trade – and it cannot solve all the world’s problems. We must not lose 
sight of its primary objective to bring prosperity, strengthen the economy – being an 
engine for jobs and growth. 
Last but not least, we have priority four – levelling the playing field. This means 
promoting our standards and protecting EU companies and workers from unfair 
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competition. We have a unique opportunity to do this. Our market encompasses 
more than 500 million people. We have a nominal GDP of over 17 trillion EUR. If we 
decide to set standards, if we fly the flag for open trade, if we promote the rules – 
people have to listen. 
Our preference is and always has been negotiated solutions. However, if that does 
not work, we need to be more assertive and stand up for our rights. We do this in 
using our Trade Defence Instruments. And we have made a proposal for the 
updating of the Enforcement Regulation – to defend our interest when others block 
dispute resolution. In a similar spirit, we are advancing with the International 
Procurement Instrument – the EU has some of the most open public procurement 
markets in the world. This is a good thing, but markets elsewhere are not as open to 
EU companies as ours are. We are also reflecting on new instruments to address the 
distortive effects of foreign subsidies on our internal market. 
So that is how the EU plans to assert itself on the world stage: 
• fighting for predictable, rules-based trade; 
• managing key relationships, new and old; 
• leveraging trade for other objectives; and  
• levelling the playing field. 
We do this not for an imaginary future, nor for ideological reasons – we do it because 
it is what works. The EU is arguably more integrated into global markets than any 
other region in the world. We have gained spectacularly from it, and we want to 
continue to do so. 
 
Future perspectives 
In an age of division and in the face of a digital Cold War, the European Union 
refuses to surrender to our lesser instincts. We will cut a path – based on 
multilateralism, on environmentalism, on openness – that means we do not ‘pick a 
side’. Instead, we will use our weight to move the centre of gravity back towards 
these issues. In trade, this means rallying partners to demonstrate the benefits of 
interconnection and showing that interdependence is not a weakness, but a 
strength. You can see this strategy in our negotiating agenda over the past several 
years. The EU have a large number of agreements now – we signed 15 in the last 
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Commission’s mandate alone. It is still early days for a number of these new 
agreements, but signs are good nonetheless.  
Japan is another great success. It is the biggest bilateral trade agreement ever 
negotiated. It covers an area of over 630 million people. It accounts for almost more 
than a quarter of the world's GDP. The barriers lowered should add 33 billion EUR to 
EU GDP by 2035. 
These are more than just numbers – they have real world impacts. They support over 
36 million jobs at home, and connect us to global growth in a time where we need it. 
In the coming years, 85% of growth will happen outside Europe. Trade policy brings 
stability and predictability to all economic operators in the EU and beyond. It opens 
up opportunities for business to continue to grow and thrive, and lowers prices and 
increases quality for consumers. 
And our policy makes sure there are rules to play by – a critical thing in particular for 
smaller businesses who rely on these opportunities. Often big businesses can 
navigate more uncertainty, but smaller ones can be crushed in the jostling of 
international relations. 
I could go on into other benefits – how the Vietnam agreement has given us a 
foothold in ASEAN, strengthening our presence in Asia and our leverage on 
encouraging sustainable development in the region. I could go into detail on 
Cambodia – how respect for human and labour rights is central to our Generalised 
System of Preferences and Everything But Arms initiatives. I could talk about the 
perception of trade policy – how our Eurobarometer shows that 60% of Europeans 
feel that they personally benefit from international trade. That is 16 percentage 
points more than 10 years ago. 
But, as in academia and research, it is often better to get references from others 
rather than assert something yourself. Just the other day, the US’s Commerce 
Department attempted to introduce rules to block US companies working with 
Huawei and other Chinese companies. This was blocked by the Pentagon – an 
organisation one would think is probably well versed in security. They pointed out 
that blocking key sources of revenue and exchange would deprive them of money 
and incentives – just the ingredients for the research and developed needed to help 
the US maintain a technological edge. 
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This gives me hope. The debate is not over. We still have the opportunity to make 
sound arguments and build support for international trade worldwide. We can make 
facts matter again. We can stand up for our values on the world stage, building 
alliances and supporting multilateralism. 
 
Conclusion 
The current trade environment is characterised by manifold challenges. Many of 
these are driven by the swing towards populism and away from liberalism. Others 
come from mega-trends like digitalisation and climate change. In light of these 
challenges, there are three things we need to do. 
First, we need to accept that uncertainty has become the new normal. We have 
experienced an unprecedented period of growth and stability – particularly in 
Europe – over the past several decades. We have become used to these calm seas, 
but now we are entering uncertain waters. We need to get used to this style of 
navigation. 
Second, we need to explain more and much better. Not just to each other, but also 
to citizens. There is a lot at stake – communicating in tangible terms on the benefits of 
trade is key, but being honest about the possible negative effects too. It is only 
through this that we will rebuild trust – and ultimately fight the instinct to build up 
borders and barriers. 
Finally, we need to be prepared to break down the barriers in our own institutional 
thinking. The fact is that the worlds of security, economics, trade and technology are 
now colliding. We must find a way to cope with this new reality – projecting our 
values at multiple levels. This is in part behind the thinking of our four priorities. 
It is here, in the College of Europe, that the next generation of EU official, diplomats, 
civil society activists, business representatives and politicians are preparing 
themselves for the world. I feel lucky to address you directly, and in light of these 
lessons I would ask you to do three things for us: 
• we need you to think interdisciplinary, 
• we need you to be politically sensitive communicators, and 
• we need you to be prepared to operate in a new, uncertain environment. 
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While the first two are skills that you can learn here in the College, the last is the most 
difficult to ask. For inspiration, I will leave you with the words of a wonderful 
Bohemian-Austrian poet and true European, Rainer Maria Rilke:  
“Have patience with everything that remains unsolved in your heart. Live in the 
question.” 
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